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Abstract 
Foreign Policy of Developmental State:  
South Korean Foreign Policy Role during the First Oil Crisis  
The paper examines the South Korean foreign policy role to overcome the first oil crisis 
in 1973 and balance of payment to sustain the industrialization. The paper looks inside to the 
developmental state foreign policy supportive features to overcome international constraints.   
Paper argues that foreign policy played an important role for the late-industrializing 
countries to develop industrialization because of the rapidly changing international 
environment during the Cold War. One of the most challenging international constraints was 
the first oil crisis. The crisis was more catastrophic because it combined with the United 
States hegemonic decline in world oil supply. During the Cold War, small states were hard to 
proceed “independent” foreign policy based on national interest when their security 
dependent on superpowers. Even though, South Korean government made a decision to 
support Arab state‟s position concerning Israeli-Arab conflict. This foreign policy step was 
specific in “independent” and pragmatic behaviors in limited framework under the power. 
The paper shows that without making this foreign policy “shift” to settle the relationship 
between Middle Eastern countries and further foreign policy backup for national companies 
to penetrate to the new market, South Korean export-oriented industrialization strategy was 
difficult to sustain since she very dependent on foreign natural resource and market.  
 
Keywords: South Korea, Middle East, international constraint, foreign policy of 
developmental state, export-oriented industrialization, oil crisis, energy dependency. 
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I. Introduction and Research Question 
After the Korean War, South Korea implemented state-led strategy to develop economy 
in short period while western countries were recommending free market policy to restrict 
state role in economy. Therefore, this economic development theoretically called once again 
the state role with its successful intervention in economy. Nonetheless, this state intervention 
was not limited in the domestic economic level. South Korean government actively supported 
the outward looking development strategy by her foreign policy.   
There were many studies enquiring the secret of South Korea‟s successful 
industrialization. Definitely, there were number of factors influenced to this economic 
development. Nevertheless, there is one factor not enough discussed when to study 
development of late-industrializing countries. Literatures on developmental state or late-
industrializing countries overlooked the importance of external environment of the 
development process. Generally, the Cold War era was highlighted as peaceful and benefit to 
the newly industrialized economies. As Cold War Allies of the United States, they received 
special treatment in American allied markets and were able to pursue an export-led growth 
strategy because of the global free-trade environment under the power.
1
  
On the contrary, this favorable condition is not lasted long due to many reasons but the 
most influential reasons were; first, undoubtedly the decline of hegemonic power of United 
States. Secondly, the East Asian developmental states have become susceptible to the 
pressures of economic globalization, unable to protect their home markets and thus have been 
unable to shelter their infant industries from international competition.
2
 From the beginning 
of the 1970s, as the economies of developed countries were suffering from severe worldwide 
recession, new import restrictions were being imposed by erecting various nontariff trade 
barriers such as global and bilateral quotas, voluntary export restraints, government 
purchasing regulations, safety and industrial standards, health and sanitary regulations, and 
trigger pricing systems.
3
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Apparently, literatures acknowledged the importance of international constraints to these 
developments. For instance, they stressed the level of international competition, the 
technology gap
4
, international shocks and pressures, the role of macroeconomic shocks
5
, and 
global changes.
6
 Then again, loophole of the existing literatures are in not enough study 
made in how these countries policies taken to overcome these not favorable constraints, its 
consequence to domestic market and decision making of the country.  
Therefore, this paper argues that secret of late-industrializing countries lays in the 
adjustment policies to external constraints.  
South Korean outward looking industrialization had come through specific international 
environment changes as same as to any late-developers. For instance, as Korea moved into 
1970s, there was emerged a number of sudden external changes those directly harmful to 
growth strategy of economy. In 1971, the Nixon administration carried out its plan to reduce 
the U.S. number of military troops stationed in Korea by one-third, thus compelling Korea to 
accelerate the development of her own defense industries. In the same year, following the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, protectionism in advanced countries began to rise, 
forcing Korea to change the composition of her exports.
7
 Finally, the quadrupling of oil 
prices in 1973-1974 was big shock to Korean government hence it dependent on foreign oil.  
South Korean rapid economic growth since the 1960s caused a sharp increase in energy 
consumption. Country‟s dependency on foreign oil was increasing drastically in order to meet 
the requirement posed by industrialization. During the period 1962-1973, Korea‟s oil 
consumption grew at an annual average rate of 28 percent, while that of non-oil energy 
resources grew at only 2 percent. From 1955 to 1973 Korea‟s dependence on imported 
energy sources increased from 15 to 58 percent and reached as high as 74 percent in 1979.
8
 
Crude oil is used mainly by refineries to fuel the transportation, manufacturing, and power 
sectors. For instance, the following table presents that how deeply South Korean 
industrialization dependent on imported oil.  
Table1. Energy Demand in Korea in 1970 and 1975, Projection of Energy Demand in: 1981, 
1986 and 1991
9
  
 
Sector  
 
1970 
 
1975 
 
1981 
 
1986 
 
1991 
GNP Elasticity  
1971-
75 
1976-
81 
1982-
86 
1987-
91 
Industry  15,728 25,109 57,346 98,427 162,725 1.00 1.33 1.14 1.06 
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 (40.6) (46.5) (57.8) (61.0) (62.5) 
Transportation 
  
3,894 
(10.0) 
5,672 
(10.5) 
11,487 
(11.6) 
21,789 
(13.5) 
40,125 
(15.4) 
0.80 1.13 1.37 1.30 
Residential 
  
16,198 
(41.8) 
19,045 
(35.2) 
23,479 
(23.6) 
30,248 
(18.7) 
40,445 
(15.6) 
0.34 0.32 0.52 0.60 
Others 
 
2,937 
(7.6) 
4,233 
(7.8) 
6,953 
(7.0) 
10,972 
(6.8) 
61,931 
(6.5) 
0.77 0.78 0.96 0.91 
Total Demand  
 
38,757 
(100.0) 
54,049 
(100.0) 
99,265 
(100.0) 
161,436 
(100.0) 
260,226 
(100.0) 
0.70 0.96 1.02 1.01 
 
The table presents that from 40.6-46.5 percent of oil used for the purpose of 
industrialization concerning years of the paper. South Korea‟s half of imported oil used for 
industrialization process in that period. South Korea used almost half of her imported crude 
oil to run industrialization because there were no alternative resources to produce electricity.  
While South Korea was becoming dependent on foreign oil, the world faced two big oil 
shocks that caused recession among the oil importing countries. For example, as a result of 
the 1973 oil embargo
10
, the world spent an extra $5.1 billion on oil. American real GDP 
declined by 2.5 percent, which is about $38 billion.
11
 Seven of the eight postwar recessions 
in the United States have been preceded by a dramatic increase in the price of crude.
12
  
Contrary, during heat of the crisis, Korea managed to increase its GNP by 13.2 percent in 
1973 and by another 8.1 percent in 1974. The export also grew 38.3 percent in 1974.
13
  
The shock in 1973 was one of the cases that faced to Korea when her interest conflicts to 
the interest of United States moreover the constraint cannot be solved with the under the 
established framework of the power. At that time South Korea was dependent on three 
American oil companies for the oil supply. The Gulf Corporation, Caltex Inc. and the Union 
Oil were charge of South Korean oil supply. The Gulf Corporation
14
 on November 6, 1973 
notified to South Korean government that the amount of crude oil shipped to Korea would 
decrease by 30% from the month of November onwards. This step was taken without any 
advance notice or negotiation. Caltex Inc. also informed to decrease by 10%, and Union Oil 
let it be known by 20%. All in all, 22% of the overall oil regularly supplied to Korea was 
                                       
10 The first oil crisis resulted from the War broke out in the Middle East on 6th of October in 1973 that known 
as the Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War. The war began when the President of Egypt Anwar Sadat 
orchestrated a surprise attack on Israel. Representatives from six oil producing Arab States held an emergency 
meeting in Kuwait on October 16
th
 and, announced their intention to raise oil prices by 17 percent that from 3.12 
dollars to 3.65 dollars a barrel. Next day on 17
th
 of October, the ten OPEC members held another meeting in 
Kuwait, decided to decrease oil production by 5 percent every month until Israel withdrew troops from the 
occupied Arab lands.  
11
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12
 James D.Hamilton. 1983. Oil and the Macro-economy since World War II. Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 91, No. 2 (April). 228-248, 245 
13
 O Won-chol. 2009. The Korea History: President Park Jung-hee’s Leadership and the Korean Industrial 
Revolution. Wisdom Tree Publishing. 261 
14
 Gulf Oil Corporation controlled some 50% of the oil refineries at that time, affiliation with the public entity 
known as the Korean National Oil Corporation.   
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being literally pulled of the table.
15
 So thus, international oil companies as well as American 
power decline in the region consolidated crisis in South Korea.  
The relatively stable postwar petroleum regime, managed by the large oil firms and 
protected by American diplomatic and military strength, collapsed.
16
 This American decline 
in the region made South Korea has to compete with advanced countries Japan as well as 
America in the “new” oil market. American state power became much less effective: since 
the 1973-1974 OAPEC embargo and oil prices rises, the United States government has been 
unable to “break OPEC,” to reduce oil prices, or even to guarantee adequate supplies in 
emergencies. The position of the “seven sisters” has also been eroded. In 1973, the seven 
most important international oil firms produced almost all of OPEC‟s oil and distributed 90 
percent of it. In 1980, however, about 45 percent of internationally traded oil was being sold 
directly by producing countries, to governments, to independents, on the spot market, or 
through other arrangements,
17
 as next figure shows.  
Figure1. The Changing Balance of World Oil Production, 1945-2003
18
 
 
There is another important fact to consider in regarding to character of the first oil crisis. 
The first oil crisis was motivated Arab states political interest rather than just economic 
interest. The embargo was taken by Arab states against western countries as well as United 
                                       
15 O Won-chol. 2009. The Korea History: President Park Jung-hee’s Leadership and the Korean Industrial 
Revolution. Wisdom Tree Publishing. 264 
16
 Ibid 105 
 
17
 Robert O. Keohane. 1982. State Power and Industry Influence: American Foreign Oil Policy in the 1940s. 
International Organization. Vol., 36 / Issue 01/ December, 166  
 
18
 Simon Bromley. 2005. The United States and the Control of World Oil. Blackwell Publishing. Government 
and Opposition Ltd. 231 
North
America
(USA+Cana
da+Mexico
)
Central and
Southern
America
Middle
East
China and
Soviet
Union
Others
1945 65 16 7 10 2
1973 21 9 38 17 15
2003 18.2 9.2 34.7 18.5 19.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
O
u
tp
u
t 
as
 a
 p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
w
o
rl
d
 t
o
ta
l  
  
1945
1973
2003
6 
 
States. Arab States endeavor to influence United States foreign policy concerning Arab-Israel 
conflict. The Arab states threatened to cut off the oil supply to anti-Arab countries that ally to 
United States and dependent on Arab oil. As ally of the United States, South Korea was listed 
as an anti-Arab state and subsequently was threatened with a decrease in oil supply. 
Regardless of it, in fact the amount of oil supply to South Korea presents a different result. 
The following table shows that at the midst of the energy crisis, Korea‟s crude oil supply 
actually increased by 15 percent. Korea managed to secure more than enough crude oil 
during the crucial months of the oil crisis November and December 1973.  
 Table2. The amount of crude oil introduced by KNOK during 1972-1974 (unit thousand 
barrels)
19
 
 1972 1973 1974 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
4,000 
3,056 
3,525 
4,333 
3,293 
5,328 
4,849 
3,474 
3,276 
3,897 
4,560 
4,935 
4,729 
3,704 
5,282 
4,612 
4,086 
5,415 
3,765 
5,451 
3,890 
3,763 
4,572 
6,606 
3,376 
6,227 
5,018 
4,654 
4,544 
8,157 
1,912 
4,990 
3,326 
5,046 
5,433 
5,045 
Total 48,531 55,879 57,733 
Rate of increase over the 
previous year 
- +15% +3.3% 
 
Even after the oil crisis South Korea and Middle Eastern relation is flourished that helped 
South Korea to overcome balance of payment and opened the new big market. Following 
tables show the dramatic change of the economic relation before and after the oil crisis 
between Korean and Middle East. Next table shows one of the rapidly growing economic 
relations between two sides.  
Table3. South Korea‟s Construction Contracts in Middle Eastern Countries, 1973-77, (unit in 
million US$)
20
   
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
Saudi Arabia 24.1 76.9 504.9 2,134.9 2,406.2 5,147.0 
Iran    60.4 5.2 326.5 392.1 
Kuwait   0.5 205.0 257.5 463.0 
Bahrain   160.0 13.2 97.3 270.5 
The UA Emirates    15.8  141.6 157.4 
Qatar    8.4 48.4 56.8 
                                       
19
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20
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policy of the ROK. Columbia University Press. 252 
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Jordan   11.9 8.3 37.8 1.9 59.9 
Iraq      30.4 30.4 
 
Based on two contradicting before mentioned facts that are South Korean economic 
growth during the recession and increased oil supply during the crisis moreover flourished 
relation between Middle Eastern countries have only one answer that is the result of South 
Korean foreign policy.  
The paper argues South Korea‟s successful overcoming of the oil crisis is related to her 
active, flexible and pragmatic foreign policy. South Korean foreign policy to support Arab 
states position concerning Israel at the beginning of the first oil crisis is specific in its 
“independent” and pragmatic behavior in limited framework under the power. This was one 
of the South Korean foreign policy achievements to support domestic economy by making 
political step “countering” the interest of United States.  
States under security umbrella of superpower are hard to implement their national interest 
pursuing pragmatic foreign policy. South Korea seeks to advance her security, autonomy and 
economic prosperity through foreign policy like other countries. It is particularly sensitive 
aspect of Korea‟s policy toward the United States that, while it has sought to maximize its 
security with the help of America and to have independent policy even in economic sense.
21
  
For foreign policy makers, the question is not merely an appreciation of the multi-
sectorial nature of energy as a policy area, but its placement within the sequence of national 
interests and its ability to mediate the overall foreign policy stance of the state or region. So 
thus here comes out the government role to serve as a mediator between domestic market and 
the international arena. Means, political and economic concerns about the supply and demand 
of energy resources are strongly connected since the crisis.  
There are studies concerned comparative advantage of South Korea‟s successful 
overcoming of the oil crisis.
22
 Previous studies highlighted the measures taken by Korean 
government to adjust alarming deterioration in Korea‟s balance of payment. Nevertheless, the 
balance of payment was not the highest priority for the Korean government at the beginning 
of the crisis and after. Rather, it was necessary to find stable and reliable oil exporting partner. 
The reason was that the price of oil is exogenously determined for Korea, and the level of 
demand for oil is not very sensitive to a change in the short run. Therefore Korean 
government primary concern was how to secure stable supply of oil at the world price.
23
 The 
oil embargo prompted the countries to respond through foreign political decisions concerning 
the conflict before taking economic policy measures to overcome the balance of payment. 
The South Korean foreign policy during the oil crisis is insufficiently noted and I argue 
that this is the important case to be explored because of following reasons. The first oil crisis 
                                       
21
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was the case that South Korea had to overcome by herself not relying on United States or any 
other country. Despite differences in resources and national energy industries, all nations 
were under pressure to develop adjustment policies. The shocks were exogenous, and all 
governments were pressed to respond to the crisis.
24
 United States hegemonic decline was 
very much connected to world oil supply neither to Korea obviously. Second, the oil market 
in Middle East demanding active foreign policy back-up to newly comers to this field. In the 
Middle East the states were start to play by their own due to U.S. hegemonic decline in the 
region.  
As ally of the United States, South Korea faced dilemma. The dilemma arose not only 
because of United States foreign policy of strong support to Israel, but also since Israel was 
one of South Korea‟s partners at international arena already from the time going back to the 
Korean War.
25
  
After the embargo on 16
th
 of October in 1973, South Korean government announced that 
supporting the position of the Arab countries in the current Middle Eastern situation on 15
th
 
of December in 1973.
26
 After this statement, on 26
th
 of December, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
had agreed to greatly ease restrictions on supply to South Korea, treating it as a friendly 
country. At that time, Saudi Arabia supplies 65 percent of South Korea‟s crude oil imports 
and Kuwait 25 percent through three American oil companies.
 27
 In total this statement 
brought and secured 90 percent of oil supply. The emphasis on oil diplomacy is a successful 
example of South Korea‟s flexible and pragmatic foreign policy.28  
In a glance, it looks just an ordinary economic interest based foreign policy decision. On 
the other hand, during the Cold War heat, it was almost an impossible and rare to make 
“independent” foreign policy decision based on economic interest beyond ideological crusade.  
This foreign policy “shift” had political consequence to South Korea such as cooling the 
relation with Israel and United States. United State reacted to this decision immediately even 
sending special study mission to Korea. Those envoys designed to make report about the 
relation between Arab states and South Korea to the House of Foreign Affairs Committee.
29
 
                                       
24
 G. John Ikenberry. 1986. The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s. 
International Organization, pp. 105-137 Published online: 22 May 2009. 119 
 
25
 Young Sam Ma. 2010. Israel‟s Role in the UN during the Korean War. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs IV:3 
Young Sam Ma has been the Korean Ambassador to Israel since 2008.  
 
26Korea‟s new position was an overt recognition of the UN Resolution 242 epitomized in the following 
statements: 1) The Arab-Israel conflict must be resolved on peaceful and equitable terms. 2) Conflict settlement 
must involve the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories the Jewish state occupied during the June 1967 
War. 3) The national rights of the Palestine people must be recognized in any Arab-Israeli settlement. 4) Korea 
supports the sovereignty, independence, existence, and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Middle East. 
Dong Ah Il Bo Dec. 12, 1973 
 
27
 Seoul Reports: Easing of Arab‟s Curbs on Oil. New York Times. December 27,1973 
 
28
 Yong U. Glasure. 2002. Energy and National Income in Korea: Further Evidence on the Role of Omitted 
Variables. Energy Economics 24  
 
29 Report by Special Study Mission to Japan, Taiwan and Korea to the House of Foreign Affairs 
Committee April 10, 1974. Ed Se-Jin Kim. Documents on Korean American Relations 1943-1976. Research 
Center for Peace and Unification 1976. 456  
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Moreover in 1978, Israel shut down her embassy in South Korea because of flourishing 
relation between Korea and Arab states.
30
 How come South Korea could implement such 
flexible and pragmatic foreign policy during the Cold War?  
There are numbers of studies on South Korean economic development as well as late 
industrializing countries. In an overall view, these studies focused on state role in domestic 
economy and internal institutional role in development. Developmental state theorists 
focused into the “state” itself such as regime type, institutions and economic planning in 
domestic level. The limitation of this approach is they rarely discussed about how these late-
industrialized countries overcome the international constraints and how this developmental 
state model reacts when face to external challenge. I argue that the success of late-comers‟ 
development secret are also hidden in their adjustment policies to overcome the international 
constraints.  
The paper aims to analyze that South Korea‟s successful foreign policy role to overcome 
the oil crisis within the theory of developmental state but looking into how this model worked 
when it faces to international constraints. Through this paper I look after the answer from 
developmental state foreign policy decision making features to explain South Korea‟s foreign 
policy pragmatism and its further role in development of industrialization.  
The paper proceeds as follow. At the part two I made a brief literature review on South 
Korean development as well as late-industrializing countries. Next part look into the 
developmental state theory enquiring foreign policy features developmental state. The fourth 
part clarifies the picture of South Korea‟s relation to Middle Eastern countries. The following 
chapter is devoted to the South Korea‟s foreign policy role based on developmental state 
characteristics. The last part summarizes the findings and possible suggestions from the study.  
II. Review: Literature on South Korean Development 
South Korean rapid economic development studied by from many perspectives. There are 
plenty of independent variables those explaining the success of Korean industrialization. Two 
                                                                                                                       
From this report it looks they paid attention to South Korean „pro-Arab‟ position from the beginning. 
However, the fact is they also agreed on need for the economic situation to the shift of foreign policy.  
The report concluded that “It is our opinion that in the final analysis the situation may present some stresses 
and strains for United States-South Korean relations”. 
  “While added military expenditures may impede the economic growth rate it is already seriously 
clouded by the devastating effect of the energy crisis. Since Korea depends on oil for 85 percent of its 
energy requirements, and all of this oil is imported from the Mideast, the impact of petroleum price 
increases has been especially hard on the Korean economy.  
While endorsing cooperative action among the oil-consuming nations to obtain price rollbacks, the 
Korean have been compelled to move cautiously away from identification with the United States 
toward a more “pro-Arab” position, a move aimed in part at least at offsetting the favorable position 
already enjoyed by North Korea within the Arab States.  
One result of this unilateral effort by South Korea is a recent agreement whereby Korea will supply 
cement to Saudi Arabia in return for an assured supply of oil. In turn, their oil needs now appear to be 
adequately met.”  
30
 Yaacov Cohen. 2006. The Improvement in Israel-South Korean Relations. Jewish Political Studies Review. 
18:1-2 (Spring) 
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main streams of the literatures are neoliberal and state centric approach. The theory of the 
developmental state emphasizes that the state should play the central role in economic 
development. Therefore, state centric approach highlights the point that non-economic-
especially political institutions are vital to the modern market economy. The significant role 
of states in creating economic development is recognized in studies of Newly Industrializing 
Countries (henceforth NIEs) and in Third-World development.  
Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson raised core concern of modern comparative political 
economy; the role of political institutions in economic performance. What difference have 
modern states made to the development of the market economy? Under what conditions and 
for what purposes have states assisted the process of industrial advancement? Why do 
modern states differ so considerably in their capacity for governing the market? And how has 
the nature of state strength and its importance for a prosperous economy changed over time?
 
31
 These are conventional research questions for the state centric literatures on NIEs of East 
and Southeast Asia.
 
  
From my point of view these approaches fail to answer these questions properly due to 
their approaches to answer those limits their scope of the study.  
The limitation of state centric approach can be defined because of their main subject of 
research question which is “state”. When they consider state‟s role in economic development 
usually focus on state role in domestic economic policy such as “strong states” 32 non-
economic – especially political – institutions are vital to the constitution, maintenance, and 
transformation of the market economy.33 Regarding to previous questions, state centric 
approach not much considered about the external condition and its implication to domestic 
economy.   
As Amsden said Korea is the evidence of industrialized country that driven by strong 
interventionist state. The reason was late-comers required state intervention to develop 
industrialization because their curses of backwardness were greater than previously 
industrialized advanced countries.
34
 But this backwardness is not only talking about the high 
technology, they were left behind to have a position or share in international market. 
Consequently, late-comers needed state intervention to penetrate into already settled and high 
competitive international market.   
Among the state centric scholars Stephan Haggard study shows why similarly situating 
states pursuing the different policies in response to external pressures connecting to their 
domestic political factors. This paper continues his argument by how these similarly situated 
states overcome the external change and how the domestic institutions assisted to overcome it. 
Haggard considered South Korea did “take off” as the result of policies that allow it to exploit 
comparative advantage more fully.
35
 This comparative advantage variable is applicable to 
South Korean overcome of the oil crisis due to her construction work and workers. This paper 
                                       
31
 Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson. 1995. States and Economic Development. Polity Press. 1-2 
 
32
 Whang In-Joung. 1997. Economic Transformation of Korea, 1945-95: Issues and Responses. The Sejong 
Institute. 47, 66 
 
33
 Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson. 1995. States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis. Polity Press  
 
34
 Amsden, Alice H. Asia’s Next Giant. 1989. New York: Oxford University Press. 55 
 
35
 Stephan Haggard. 1990. Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing 
Countries. Cornell University Press  
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differs in looking for specifically that how those domestic institutions supported and 
collaborated with foreign policy response to international constraints. I agree with definition 
of Haggard that the state is not only an actor but a set of institutions that exhibit continuity 
over time. Based on this definition the paper argues that how South Korean domestic 
institutions supported the foreign policy intervention with the connection of the 
developmental state model. 
There is little number of studies on how South Korea reacted to the external conditions. 
Byung-Sun Choi‟s study show that what aspects of Korea‟s political and institutional of the 
economic policy-making in Korea has permitted a strategic and highly flexible response to 
the changing domestic and external political economic conditions.
36
 Byung-Sun Choi 
focused on the role of EPB role in economic decision making. My paper continues Byung-
Sun Choi‟s study in more detailed analyze in foreign policy and economic planning 
correlation. The paper is not aimed to continue about the role of the developmental state in 
domestic economy but it further looks into how this state “works” when it faces external 
change.    
 Another main stream neoliberal approach argues that the success of late industrializing 
countries has been come true their reliance on the market and the minimal role of the state in 
the economy.   
Neoliberal view of high performing Asian economies (HPAEs)
37
, emphasized the crucial 
things in economic development beside the interventionist policy of the state such as: 
securing basic rights, population growth decline, better educated labor force, effective system 
of public administration, stable macro-economic performance, price distortion, openness to 
foreign ideas and technology. 
Limitation of the neoliberal approach not enough discussed how these NIEs overcome 
international constraints through their economic policies. My argument is the first oil crisis 
was test for the neoliberal and state centric approach. Certainly, oil crisis has shown different 
implications for the country by country according to their natural resource. There is no doubt 
that oil price increase influence to oil exporting countries Indonesia and Malaysia contrary 
highly dependent foreign oil countries Korea and Taiwan. Concerning to the oil crisis, it is 
impossible to generalize and ignore oil importing and oil exporting countries economic 
development in both approaches. In addition, Stephan Haggard criticized the weakness of 
dependency writing on NICs, as similarly situated states frequently pursue different policies 
in response to external pressures.
 38
   
Neoliberal economist Bela Balasa made a study about how newly industrializing 
developing countries policy responses after the oil shock.
39
 Bela Balasa considered the 
external shock in terms of trade and export effects. This study is accounted the balance of 
payments effect and policy responses such as additional net external financing, increase in 
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export market share, import substitution and import effects of lower GNP growth. Korea 
suffered the largest terms of trade loss in 1974, equivalent to one half of the average value of 
its exports and imports. The study shows that the quadrupling of petroleum prices accounted 
for the two-thirds of this loss. In Korea, the terms of trade improved in subsequent years 
when the rise of petroleum prices decelerated. In 1974, the combined balance-of-payments 
effects of external shocks equaled 9 percent of the GNP in Korea. South Korea‟s reliance on 
foreign borrowing, investment incentives and reducing government deficit in order to 
overcome the adverse effects of external shocks in 1974. This study is worthy in respect of 
that how newly industrializing countries overcoming of adverse effects of the oil crisis but it 
lacks to explain these countries policy responses at the beginning of the shock.  
 
III. Features of Foreign Policy Decision Making  
In Developmental State 
What are the characteristics of Developmental state foreign policy? South Korean foreign 
policy is analyzed as dependent state foreign policy that only looks for how to gain 
bargaining power thorough foreign policy or look for independent foreign policy
40
 or further 
or recent directions of the relation with United States, Japan and North Korea.
41
 As a close 
ally of the U.S., South Korean foreign policy had to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. and 
generalized constantly adopt a rigid, hawkish anti-Communist and anti-North Korea policy 
during the period.
42
 Therefore, as Kang Sung-Hack defined the South Korean foreign policy 
characteristic as “bandwagoning” concerning the security relationship with United States.43 
So thus, Korean foreign policy considered as dependent state foreign policy.  
Bruce E. Moon defined the foreign policy of dependent state as foreign policy orientation 
of weak nations comes to reflect the preferences of more powerful nations. The ability of a 
powerful nation to alter the foreign policy behavior of a weaker nation has long been 
recognized.
44
 As he clarified in that …while there have been numerous descriptions of 
individual instances of both successful and unsuccessful influence attempts, little effort has 
been made to generalize about the sources of such influence, the process through which it is 
manifested, or the conditions under which it can be expected to operate. It defines the why 
foreign policy of certain weak state analysis is limited by just how to influence to the 
powerful country or how to have independent foreign policy.  
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On the contrary, Peter J. Katzenstein
45
 made an important conclusion about states 
divergent strategies
46
 of foreign economic policy when they face common crisis like oil 
crisis. His study covered United States, West Germany, France, Italy and Japan and their 
foreign economic policy reaction to oil crisis. His conclusion was: 
“… America no longer holds the position of overwhelming power which it 
enjoyed in the immediate postwar era. To a greater extent than in the 1950s and 
1960s the strategies of foreign economic policy of advanced industrial state now 
reflect their domestic structure. … The divergence in foreign economic policies in 
the 1970s is due to principally to differences in domestic structures.”  
Based on this conclusion I raise the argument that South Korean pragmatic and flexible 
foreign policy is should have reflected the developmental state characters during the oil crisis 
since the state defined as developmental state model. This idea is also come in Ikenberry 
study which is very much connected to this paper. By his words,  
“The state is an organization staffed by executive officials positioned to 
make, when historical moments allow, strategic choices. At this level of analysis the 
preferences and choices of government officials, particularly political and 
administrative officials of the executive branch, may be considered an analytic 
surrogate for state behavior. The state is also a structure that fixes in place channels 
of access to the society and economy as well as the instruments and institutions of 
government. The state as actor and the state as structure are related: at moments of 
crisis and change, as during the oil shocks, the distinctive structure of the state itself 
shapes and constraint the substance of strategic policy. The policy instruments and 
institutional resources available to government elites form the most important 
determinants of adjustment policy when crisis presents new challenges to 
governments.”47  
Connecting to my argument Peter Gourevitch explained the domestic structure as a 
variable in explaining foreign policy.
48
 He argues that South Korean foreign policy decision 
is much more reflected the domestic political institutions. But he did not connect the 
domestic institution and character of the state to the foreign policy.  
So, my argument is foreign policy of developmental state is not suitable to be studied in 
the framework of foreign policy dependency as mentioned before looking for independent 
steps or bargaining power. It is crucial to see how developmental state overcomes the 
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international constraints and how it reflects the character of developmental state. In addition, 
foreign policy of developmental state reaction is different from foreign policy of dependent 
state when it faces the externality that challenges its development. In a sum, the paper shows 
how foreign policy decision making of the developmental state has reflected the character of 
itself.  
Accordingly, the paper enquires the character of developmental state and its inference in 
foreign policy. Developmental states main characteristics as defined by existing literatures 
are: first, a strong ambition to develop giving priority to economic growth
49
, second, 
“embedded autonomy”50 is a crucial element for effectiveness of state intervention, third, no 
interest group pressure due to her authoritarian regime, and fourth “pilot agency”51 with 
professional institution to carry out state intervention plan. Based on these characters of 
development state, the paper shows the connection between foreign policy.  
1. No Interest Group Pressure and Political Advantage   
Working “free” from pressure by different social interests and policy consistency is one 
of political character and could have been seen as of developmental state political advantage 
to make decision.  
There was little room for interest groups to exert any influence over security policy 
making due to Cold War.
52
 An authoritarian regime can reduce policy fluctuations by 
insulating itself for pressures of various interest groups and avoid critical influence of an 
electoral cycle.
53
 So thus, the foreign policy decision making is protected from the interest 
groups of the domestic policy. Contrary, in societies with weak states policy formation 
corresponds to a model of pluralistic government: social forces are well organized and robust. 
Public institutions are fragmented; power is formally distributed among a larger number of 
interdependent but autonomous agencies. These pieces of the state are captured by different 
private interests.
54
  
The common use of internal security legislation and agencies, secret police and party 
organizations has been standard practice in bolstering the state and controlling civil society in 
all developmental states. Everyway mass media and labor organizations have been strictly 
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controlled.
55
 „Speed and flexibility‟56 of policy response to problems of authoritarian regime 
also played a crucial role in economic decision making which is very much connected to this 
free from interest group pressure.  
Another political “advantage” of developmental is state‟s strong ambition to develop –
developmental ideology
57
 an authoritarian regime can forge or impose a national ideology 
hard work and sacrifice for economic development.  
These political advantages of developmental state influenced to South Korean foreign 
policy decision during the oil crisis such as being pragmatic to achieve development, and 
urgent measure could have been justification for any measure taken by the government.  
 
2. Centrality in Decision Making    
Connecting to the state model, the concentration of policy decision bureaucracy is under 
the control of ruling body. In autocratic regimes, the orientation of policy will depend upon 
the desires and motivations of the leadership.
58
  
This centrality of decision making of the development state have advantage when the 
government urged or pressed to make decision in short time to react unexpected external 
challenge. During the oil crisis, there was criticism about United States decision making. 
America could not react to oil crisis immediately because of weak state structure. The 
influence of powerful societal interests often prevents the formulation and execution of strong 
and consistent state policies. For instance, in 1975, thirty-three congressional committees, 
with sixty-five subcommittees, claimed jurisdiction over the United States Energy Research 
and Development Administration.
59
  
3. Economic Planning and Foreign Policy 
The strong commitment by the political leadership to economic development motivated 
the government officials concerned to formulate realistic plans and to put greater effort into 
the successful implementation of planned targets.
60
 To promote development, political elites 
need not only achieve a measure of autonomy from local elites but also bolster the quality of 
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state institutions.
61
 Economic coordination and development has been managed by specific 
institutions, whose task has been to organize the critical interactions between state and 
economy.
62
  
The advantage of developmental state is as Peter Evans defined “embeddedness”. 
Embeddedness is as important as autonomy. Embeddedness implies a concrete set of 
connection that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with 
whom the state shares a joint project of transformation.
63
 The success of developmental state 
connects to the bureaucratic corporate coherence which is created by selective meritocratic 
recruitment and long term career rewards. In developmental state this bureaucratic corporate 
coherence embedded in a concrete in a concrete set of social ties. This binds the state to 
society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation 
of goals and policies.
64
 This embeddedness is also reflected to foreign policy. Foreign policy 
and foreign policy makers are embedded to state institutions deeply and plays a decisive role 
to accomplish economic planning especially when country have outward oriented 
development strategy.  
4. Foreign Policy Backup at International Level   
The strong state has been and continues to be one of the major mechanisms for 
determining the comparative industrial position of countries within the international 
economy.
65
 Developmental state one of foreign policy character is even at international level 
it has to back up national companies.  
State has to serve as mediator between domestic companies to compete international 
market. Since the backwardness is greater and international constraints are aggressive. 
Another measure to overcome oil crisis was to deal with Middle Eastern countries was state 
owned companies. In Japan and South Korea, national oil companies were created after the 
oil shocks of the 1970s. Asian national oil companies (ANOCs) have been rapidly acquiring 
stakes in exploration and production projects abroad. ANOC investment was challenging the 
conventional private international oil company business model. ANOCs‟ advantages were 
their willingness to engage in downstream projects, probable lower costs of capital and risk, 
and the strong diplomatic and economic support they receive from their government. The US 
and European importing counties, while having similar objectives, do not have state oil 
companies or policies specially designed to encourage private-sector companies to invest in 
foreign equity supply for domestic use.
66
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IV. South Korean Foreign Policy Transformation   
4.1. Foreign Policy Preceding Adjustment Process to the First Oil Crisis  
An understanding of Korea‟s foreign policy requires a careful analysis of the critical 
issues that have influenced Korea‟s foreign economic policy developments since the 1950s.67 
At the same time it is essential to grasp the economic meaning of the policies but also 
international environment implications to the foreign policy.  
South Korean foreign policy can be divided into two periods according to its 
characteristics due to the research period regarding to the economic development strategy 
change with her foreign policy step. First period is 1948-1960, foreign policy of 
“bandwagoning”. In the 1960s, most international economic problems were treated routinely 
as secondary matters, not requiring high-level government attention.
68
 Second, after 1965 is 
transforming period to pragmatic foreign policy regarding to South Korea‟s EOI strategy. 
Third period is developmental foreign policy period is after 1965. I chose the diplomatic 
normalization with Japan in 1965 is turning point of the beginning of pragmatic foreign 
policy regarding to South Korea‟s EOI strategy. In point of fact, EOI started from the early 
1960s and there were certain foreign policy steps but not influential as the normalization.  
Foreign Policy Period of Bandwagoning  
Due to the existence of two rival regimes South Korea was inevitably drawn into Cold 
war and her foreign policy became influenced by the nature of the bipolar ideological 
struggles. South Korean bandwagoning was the successful adaptation of its foreign policy 
since it was born in 1948. Bandwagoning in foreign policy has not been unique to Korean 
foreign policy behavior, but it has, certainly, been the Korean style of foreign policy goes 
back to the Choson dynasty.
69
  
From the beginning of South Korean independence, till the fourth republic of President 
Park Chung-hee period foreign policy tendencies exhibits small state foreign policy behaviors 
such as rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships, and resources, choose neutral 
positions, aim to cooperate and to avoid conflict with others, and spend disproportionate 
amount of foreign policy resources on ensuring physical and political security and survival.
70
  
This foreign policy tendency is undoubtedly consolidated by its economic and political 
situation. It was crucial to prevent from the renewal of Communist aggression in Korea 
keeping America‟s concern for Korea‟s security more than economic interest. Since this 
period was the economically reconstruction and import substitution industrialization period. 
The Rhee regime foreign policy of ROK characterized by absolute anticommunism, 
dependent relationship to the United States, to a limited number of other nations in the 
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western bloc, and to the United nations. Basic to this policy was breaking all forms off 
diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized North Korea.
71
  
Transformation Period 1960-1965  
After the Rhee, the second republic proclaimed some certain changes to foreign policy. 
On April 19, 1960, Ho Chong
72
 called for a gradual readjustment of Korean foreign policy. 
Comprehensive foreign policy statement was made by foreign Minister Chong Ir-hyong. The 
seven-point foreign policy goals outlined which are; in pursuance of the United Nations 
resolutions concerning the unification of Korea, concerted effort should be made to gain 
admission to the United Nations, strengthening of Korean-American relationship, 
normalization of Korean-Japanese relations, promotion of the unity of free nations, expansion 
of diplomatic activities toward nonaligned nations, encouragement of people‟s diplomacy.73 
The second republic‟s foreign policy was broader and expressed some of own priorities for 
political as well as economic interests than Rhee government. Even though, Chang‟s 
government could not implement these policies because of short time period but it still was 
opened the new priority to Korean foreign policy.  
When President Park got into power, priority of the foreign policy was to set up 
diplomatic relations as many as possible to acknowledge new revolutionary government and 
to increase diplomatic prestige in the world. This was a period that South and North Korea 
were at the “competition” to set up diplomatic relation for the same reason. The Park 
government set up diplomatic relations 24 countries during the first year of government 
whereas previous regimes maintained ties with only 13 nations.
74
    
Third republic foreign policy became broader and economic interest based than previous 
two republics. Foreign Minister Duk Shin Choi announced nine-point foreign policy program 
in 1962 to promote diplomacy with neutralist nations. Ministry intends to: 1. Solidify basic 
ties with friendly nations; 2. Promote diplomacy with neutralist nations; 3. Enhance national 
prestige through the United Nations and other international organizations; 4. Strengthen 
national security; 5. Promote international trade and economic cooperation; 6. Invigorate 
international information activities; 7. Expand cultural exchange programs; 8. Promote 
protection of Korean overseas and emigration; 9. Help diplomatic activities on the non-
governmental level.
75
  
Notable changes took place during this period subsequently adopting outward looking 
strategy. The strategy compelled the new government to pay high level attention to foreign 
policy coordinating with the economic plan and development strategy. For instance, premier 
Yo Chang Song called for positive diplomacy to support the five-year economic development 
                                       
71
 Youngnok Koo and Sung-Joo Han. 1985. Historical Legacy. 3-13. Youngnok Koo and Sung-ju Han. The 
Foreign policy of the ROK. Columbia University Press. 6 
 
72
 Ho Chong was headed the South Korean Government as acting President in 1960.  
73
 Youngnok Koo and Sung-Joo Han. 1985. Historical Legacy. 3-13, Youngnok Koo and Sung-ju 
Han. The Foreign policy of the ROK. Columbia University Press. 11 
74
 Diplomatic Meet Opens: More Free World Ties Urged on ROK by Choi. The Korean Republic 1962.05.03 
N236 
75
 9-Point policy: Government Extends Ties with Neutralists. The Korean Republic 1962.01.16 N132 
 
19 
 
program.
76
The Revolutionary government of Park was intending to make any representatives 
abroad more centralized and controlled by under the diplomatic missions.
77
 Moreover, Park 
urged to strengthen economic diplomacy and gave a right to supervise other agencies and 
their personals.
78
  
President Park‟s years was concern with the following four major foreign policy issue 
areas; further strengthening of the tie with its ally, the United State; exploring avenues for 
peaceful coexistence and unification between North and South Korea; making efforts for the 
establishment of communication channels with the Soviet Union and Communist China; and 
promoting relations to Third World countries.  
From 1960s, South Korean government started to implement some economic interest 
oriented through foreign policy. This change was very much consolidated by the EOI. The 
diplomatic normalization with Japan in 1965 was brought the pragmatism and realism to 
foreign policy rather than political interest.
79
  
U.S. security interests in Asia having changed in the late sixties and seventies from 
“containment” to “regional stability”, international conditions in this region have shown some 
characteristics. In the significant foreign policy shift, South Korea also decided to seek to 
improve its relations with other communist countries that were hostile to the Republic of 
Korea.
80
   
Foreign Policy of Developmental State Period 
Paper argues that June Declaration was critical decision to shift developmental state 
foreign policy period. On June 23 in 1973, the late president Park Chung Hee declared a 
willingness to treat with any communist countries that were not hostile to the Republic of 
Korea. Important thing to attention is that the declaration came out before the oil crisis. It 
shows that South Korean EOI is already pushing the government to look for the new market 
and natural resources regarding external constraints merged by United States hegemonic 
decline. 
Notable case of the period is South Korean successful overcoming of the oil crisis and 
penetration to the Middle Eastern market especially the case of Saudi Arabia.  
4.2. From “Even-handed policy” to “Pro-Arabia” 
The third republic of President Park introduced a new diplomatic era by June 23 
Declaration. It put an end to the lopsided pro-Western diplomacy of the previous 
governments; instead, it attempted to establish diplomatic ties with the countries of its choice, 
free from the cold war constraints and ideological barriers.
81
 The diplomatic focus of South 
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Korea and Middle Eastern countries relation was part of this policy and it was specific that 
free from the ideological crusade of cold war and more pragmatic.  
While this foreign policy transformation process, the first oil shock was big constraint to 
foreign policy and was turning point to shift pursue pragmatic foreign policy. Middle East is 
crucial to the supply of energy resources to the energy consuming countries, including Korea, 
to ensure their sustainable economic growth. Korea depends on the Middle East for more 
than 90 percent of its oil requirement. A sudden and chaotic disruption of the price of 
petroleum will severely damage the economy of Korea. For instance following table presents 
Korean oil imports by country.  
Table5. Korean Oil Imports by Country
82
 
Country  1972 1975 1977 1978 
Saudi Arabia 38,867* (42.0)** 51,861(44.0) 83,895 (57.6) 95,841(57.6) 
Kuwait 46,628 (50.4) 53,637(45.5) 49,658(32.1) 50,789(30.5) 
Iran 2,824 (3.1) 882(0.7) 16,361(10.9) 12,912(7.8) 
Neutral Zone 5,542 (6.0) 10,194(8.6) 912(0.5) 3,854(2.3) 
Other countries*** 720 (0.8) 1,221(1.2) 4,222(2.3) 3,136(1.8) 
*in thousand barrels **in percentage ***Indonesia and other source 
A sudden and chaotic disruption of the price of petroleum will severely damage the 
economy of Korea. Thus, the priority of policy option goes naturally to how to strengthen the 
interdependence and consolidate the cooperative relation between the East Asia and the 
Middle East. Thus, the priority of policy option goes naturally to how to strengthen the 
interdependence and consolidate the cooperative relation between the East Asia and the 
Middle East.
83
  
Beside the Middle Eastern countries rich natural recourses, regarding these countries low 
degree of industrialization, Middle East is new markets for South Korean export goods which 
is crucial to industrialization. Until the first oil crisis, South Korea‟s trade with the Middle 
East countries was confined to small amounts of manufactured goods exports and oil imports. 
Before the 1973, Saudi and Korean relation was not attracted by two sides because of lack of 
political and economic interest.
84
 The 1973 oil crisis and the ensuing development boom in 
Saudi Arabia reshaped the entire Saudi-Korean relationship.
85
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To reach to Third World countries and open their market was not easy task for South 
Korean government. There are following barriers were existing.  
First is ideological crusade. The most difficult barrier was South Korea‟s Middle East 
diplomacy has suffered a great because of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the formative 
years of its Middle East diplomacy, South Korea was friend of Israel since their 
establishment.
86
 This put North Korea in an advantageous position to approach Arab 
countries.  
Undoubtedly, South Korean ally to United States was still too closely identified with the 
United States. Saudis were somewhat reluctant to promote bilateral ties between the two 
countries because of the South Korean attitude on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
87
 The ROK‟s 
dispatch of troops to Vietnam was particularly damaging. For Third World the Republic of 
Korea has been one of the most faithful anticommunist countries of the world. This 
ideological stand is something the Republic of Korea cannot possibly discard at that time. 
This has put the Republic of Korea in a decisively disadvantageous position in approaching 
the Third World, which has been hostile to the cold war system.
88
   
The Third World also emphasizes ideological elements in the conduct of foreign policies 
although its emphasis is fundamentally different from the communist one. This ideological 
emphasis has had a great bearing on their individual foreign policies and has also been the 
basis on which they have taken a united stand on many international issues.  
Second barrier was less economic and political interest. The East Asian region in general 
and Korea in particular were simply not of any political and economic importance to Saudi 
Arabia at that time. The Saudi pursuit of political relationship other Third World Countries 
beyond the Arab region was chiefly focused on the Muslim states in Africa, West Asia and 
South East Asia.
89
 The Saudi lack of interest in Korea well revealed in the fact that 
throughout the 1960s the Saudi government sent only one delegation to Korea led by the 
Saudi Ambassador stationed in Tokyo in December 1965, who was in charge of Taiwan and 
Korea simultaneously.
90
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To overcome these barriers, South Korean government needed to have more flexible and 
free from ideological crusade foreign policy effort. Beginning in the latter part of the 1960s, 
South Korea was trying to modify its pro-Israeli policies and attempted to improve its 
relations with Arab countries. The watershed of this policy change was when South Korea 
supported the November 1967 resolutions of the Security Council on the Middle East that 
called for protection of the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and peace 
of the region. This change did not visibly improve Middle East countries tendency to South 
Korea.  
Not regarding step, before the crisis South Korean foreign policy not active and even 
handed regarding the Arab-Israel conflict. South Korean government has not pushed to make 
chose between Arab and Israel. The first oil embargo triggered the South Korea to make 
political decision about the conflict. After the embargo on 16
th
 of October in 1973, South 
Korean government announced that supporting the position of the Arab countries in the 
current Middle Eastern situation on 15
th
 of December in 1973.
91
 After this statement, on 26
th
 
of December, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had agreed to greatly ease restrictions on supply to 
South Korea, treating it as a friendly country. At that time, Saudi Arabia supplies 65 percent 
of South Korea‟s crude oil imports and Kuwait 25 percent through three American oil 
companies.
 92
 In total this statement brought and secured 90 percent of oil supply more 
importantly settled the political barrier with Arab states.  
This decision was first urgent step taken by the government to damp the fire and further it 
was requiring active foreign policy role to develop this very new relation with Middle East. 
Following part discusses about South Korean developmental foreign policy role concerning 
the oil crisis and penetrating to new market.  
V. Foreign Policy Role during the First Oil Crisis  
 
5.1. Political Advantage as Developmental State during the Crisis 
Free from pressure by different social interests and policy consistency is one of political 
character and could have been seen as of developmental state. Interest groups have 
traditionally been regarded as insignificant actors in Korea. There was little room for interest 
groups to exert any influence over security policy making due to Cold War.
93
  
Especially, foreign policy decision making is protected from the interest groups of the 
domestic policy. During the authoritarian era, security matters and decision-making were 
regarded to be the prerogative of the President, and the government often used security 
threats from the North as an excuse to justify its dictatorial rule. Active interest group politics 
was virtually inconceivable: only anti-Communist campaigns by pro-government pseudo-
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voluntary organizations were occasionally staged, and other interest groups did not dare to 
conduct organized activities to press the government for certain goals with regards to North 
Korea.
94
 There are critics that why Unites States could not react to the oil crisis quickly. 
There was as much disarray in the United States. A consistent policy was made impossible by 
the multitude of interests at work: oil independents and majors; coal operators and miners; 
nuclear power interests; transport; consumers; environmentalists; military and political 
lobbies; and so on.
95
 Quite simply, the handful of votes from expatriate oilmen in Dhahran or 
Teheran was infinitesimal compared with those at the command of the Zionist lobby in the 
United States.
96
  
Contrary in South Korea relating to oil crisis there was less interest conflict and lobby 
influence to struggle with government decision to support Arab states.  
And the development ideology was very high since it related to the legitimacy of Park 
regime. For instance, in 1972, President Park emphasized "The only way for our survival is 
exporting" and pushing officials and private companies to increase export.  
This political advantage of developmental state influenced to South Korean foreign policy 
decision during the oil crisis such as being pragmatic to achieve development, and urgent 
measure could have been taken because of speed and flexibility.  
 Another reason to have more pragmatic decision was consolidated by the South Korean 
energy dependency. Relative abundance of indigenous sources of energy and constrained by 
the strategic position of its Israeli ally. The United States adopted a hard line towards OPEC 
producer states.
97
 Politically, South Korean developmental state did not have to precede 
political hard line as United State did. South Korea first had to consider it energy dependency 
on Middle East and development strategy to accomplish economic plan. In addition, it was 
definitely influenced by American oil companies‟ hegemonic decline at the region that 
pushed South Korea since she was depending on American oil companies for the supply. 
Thus, these conditions consolidated to have pragmatic foreign policy during the oil crisis 
even it was countering to interest of United States.  
5.2. Centralized Decision Making during the Oil Crisis   
South Korean government was strong and was able to make decision in short time. After 
the May 1961 military coup d‟etat, almost all the foreign policy decision was concentrated 
and made by the president Park Chung Hee. Foreign policy decision making principal actors 
were almost inactive. Such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs originated the routine of foreign 
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policy but decision was made by National Security Council, and president acted as chairman 
of council and president decided all important policies as a presidential government.
98
  
Responding to the withdrawal of one US Army stationed in Korea according to Nixon 
Doctrine and oil crisis in 1973, President Park, firstly, urged to promote heavy industry as a 
base for self-defense, so in 1973, the president created the Heavy Industry Promotion 
Committee. In addition, the president commanded the establishment of the Committee for 
Long-term Measures for Resources, which had provided advisory sources for long-term 
resource policy, resource utilization, and resource exploitation. During the Park regime, the 
president himself chaired various meetings. For example, the president chaired most of the 
monthly meetings of the trade promotion Committee. The main agenda for the meeting was 
the trade promotion strategies, trade goal, and trade trend analysis as well as the trade barriers. 
The president‟s strong drive for export-oriented policy and trade expansion encouraged 
collaborations among ministries and between public and private sectors.
99
 
5.3. Foreign Policy Embeddedness in Economic Planning  
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) has played a central role in preparing and 
implementing Korea‟s various economic plans and policies ever since 1961. The minister of 
the EPB was given the concurrent title of Deputy Prime Minister and authorized to control, 
coordinate, and adjudicate among other ministries on economic matters. The DPM presides 
over the fortnightly Economic Ministers‟ Meeting attended by eleven economic ministries 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The EPB clearly has had strong support from the 
President, encouraged participation of important decision makers in the preparation and 
implementation of economic plans, and was able to control and coordinate the decisions of 
various economic ministries through its control of the national budget.
100
 
Park Jung Hee regime employed the most qualified technocrats in the EPB, who are 
equipped with expertise and authority in the field. They were charge of planning and 
executing economic development as well as coordinating and controlling the overall 
economic policy. They were completely protected from external pressure from politics and 
various interest groups by the government. The EPB‟s authority rights with regards to 
economic policy made possible the efficient work that precede the economic development 
policy.
101
  
 5.4. Foreign Policy Back-up at International Level  
Another measure to overcome oil crisis was to deal with Middle Eastern countries was 
state owned companies. In Japan and South Korea, national oil companies were created after 
the oil shocks of the 1970s.
 
In South Korea, the Korea National Oil Corporation is a simple 
model of a state company devoted entirely to managing the country‟s strategic petroleum 
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reserve, without competition from other South Korean companies in either the oil or financial 
markets.
102
 To penetrate to the Middle Eastern market South Korean government paid high 
attention to all the companies not only the KNOC.  
There could be found numbers of measures such bank guarantee, tax grant, and Fund for 
the Promotion of Overseas Collaboration to support national companies to compete in Saudi 
Arabia market. Saudi Arabia‟s high public sector concentration posed an immediate barrier to 
the Korean firms. They lacked not only entrepreneurial connections, but also macro-political 
and strategic back-up.
103
 For instance, in January 1976, Korean government established a 
separate financial fund exclusively to support overseas construction with a government 
contribution of 20 billion won and the Korean Export-Import Bank‟s contribution of 100 
million won (total US$ 400 million).
104
  
VI. Conclusion 
No nation‟s foreign policy is ever fully stable in the changing international environment. 
It is not surprising to do foreign policy shift one to another. Nevertheless, this paper 
emphasizes the South Korean foreign policy decision to support Arabian states position with 
following reasons; first, it was wholly suppressed situation under bipolar system, second, 
this policy can be considered as successful foreign policy role to support late-
industrialization, and third, this could be also good suggestion to late-industrializing 
countries those are implementing export-oriented industrialization as development strategy. 
In overall, South Korean export oriented industrialization is supported by the foreign policy 
of the country that consolidated with the character of the state model.  
 Certainly the economic interdependence is growing among countries in the world. The 
role of government is increasing in managing economies especially since the first oil shock 
state foreign policy increasingly dominated by economic policy issues.  
Thus, if external factors are crucial to late industrializers there is a need to acknowledge 
that the foreign policy role in domestic market while dealing with international constraint. It 
will not give the full picture of economic development focusing on only domestic economic 
policy especially like county South Korea when she deeply dependent on externality. From 
the South Korean case, following suggestions are possible to reconsider especially for the 
late-comers.  
First, the declining leadership role of the United States in the world economy when there 
is no new leader emerging – suggest that the politicization of international economic issues. 
Foreign policy will be the main vehicle by which states to ensure their interest to the 
international constraints. The case shows that focused, pragmatic, and flexible diplomacy 
can produce remarkable results, especially when vital economic or security interests are 
involved.  
Second, centralized decision making with economic planning board should have 
consolidated with foreign policy. To secure the collaboration between ministries using the 
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deputy prime minister position with full right to manage development policy works more 
effectively since international environment is changing rapidly that insist national 
governments to respond it as fast as possible to compete with other states.  
Third, continues foreign policy support is required to any national companies to compete 
at international market since it became more politicized and requires stable government 
policy.   
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